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Evolutionary biology has much to offer psychiatry. It distinguishes between 
ultimate and proximate explanations of behavior and addresses the 
functional significance of behavior. Subtheories, frequently voiced 
misconceptions, specific applications, testable hypotheses and limitations 
of evolutionary theory are reviewed. An evolutionary perspective is likely to 
improve understanding of psychopathology, refocus some clinical 
research, influence treatment and help integrate seemingly unrelated 
findings and theoretical explanations. 
Introduction 
Recent advances in evolutionary biology have im- 
plications for psychiatric theory, research and clin- 
ical practice. Evolutionary theory introduces a broad 
and much needed deductive framework; it facilitates 
the functional analysis of behavior; it identifies im- 
portant differences between ultimate causes and 
proximate mechanisms; it promotes a reassessment 
of current views about etiology and pathogenesis; 
and it alters treatment strategies and options. Evo- 
lutionists acknowledge that much human behavior is 
a product of personal and cultural experience, but 
argue that mind and culture themselves are products 
of evolution and are better understood when ana- 
lyzed within the evolutionary framework. 
Our assessment of the contributions that an evo- 
lutionary point of view can make to psychiatry be- 
gins with an analysis of its theoretical contributions 
followed by a discussion of common misconcep- 
tions. Possible applications to psychiatry are then 
evaluated. Finally, the limitations of the theory are 
reviewed. 
Only selected parts of evolutionary theory are dis- 
cussed. More comprehensive discussion of the the- 
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ory can be found in Williams (l), Wilson (2) and 
Alexander (3). 
Overview of the evolutionary approach to psychiatry 
Behavior 
Consider behaviors such as acquiring a mate, sexual 
intercourse, having offspring, parent-offspring bond- 
ing, stranger anxiety, infant and juvenile play, sibling 
rivalry, competition over resources, preferential in- 
vestment of resources in kin, reciprocal exchanges 
among nonkin, competition for social status, recog- 
nition and rejection of cheaters, deception of others 
and self-deception. Natural selection has shaped 
predispositions (strong biases) to engage in such be- 
haviors. Predispositions range from strong (such as 
withdrawal from a painful stimulus) to weak (such 
as preference for particular styles of music). 
The strengths of predispositions vary across indi- 
viduals. Experience and learning, which is also an 
evolved capacity, modify predispositions. Environ- 
mental options and constraints interact with evolved 
and prioritized behavior strategies to affect the prob- 
ability of immediate and long-term behavior. Psy- 
chological mechanisms (such as cognitive and psy- 
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chodynamic ones) filter, modify, organize and focus 
information that influences behavior. Behaviors to 
which most persons are not predisposed (such as 
playing the piano) can be mastered, but usually after 
considerable effort. Nonetheless, the general behav- 
ior profiles and patterns of human behavior are set 
by the species’ genome and, within limits, unfold in 
predictable ways. 
The above and other behaviors are of special in- 
terest to psychiatry for several reasons: 1) mental 
disorders are associated with detectable abnormal- 
ities in the expression of such behaviors, such as 
reduced frequency of reciprocation (4-6); 2) an ad- 
equate understanding of some mental disorders (such 
as phobias, depression and somatoform disorders) 
requires an appreciation of the functional signifi- 
cance of such behaviors and of the evolved mecha- 
nisms that regulate them (7, 8); and 3) treatment 
strategies may change (for example greater empha- 
sis on functional outcomes and increased attention 
to environmental variables) with increasing appre- 
ciation of the evolutionary perspective. 
Natural selection favors brain mechanisms that 
result in behaviors conferring a reproductive advan- 
tage. Generally, such behaviors are neither atypical 
nor pathological. With few exceptions, however, 
mental disorders are atypical, pathological and mal- 
adaptive. Evolutionary theory provides a framework 
for analyzing adaptive behavior, the mechanisms 
that regulate it and the circumstances interfering with 
its normal expression (9). Psychopathology can be 
illuminated by insights into its normal adaptive pre- 
cursors. Most phobias, for example, are exaggerated 
normal fears (10, 11); minor adaptive rituals such 
as perfectionism are precursors for obsessive-com- 
pulsive disorder (10); normal mood swings can be 
viewed as precursors for manic-depressive illness 
(12); and normal sadness and social withdrawal may 
be precursors to clinical depression (13-15). 
Subt heories 
Since the early 1960s, a number of testable subthe- 
ories have been developed to explain specific behav- 
iors. Examples include: inclusive fitness or kin se- 
lection, reciprocal altruism, parent-offspring conflict, 
and cognitive/feeling mechanisms. 
Inclusive fitness. Preferential investment in kin is 
prominent in humans, as it is in other species. The 
tendency is to invest more in close than in distant 
kin, and for parents to invest more in offspring than 
vice versa. Hamilton (16) postulated that certain 
kin-related behavior is selected because it favors in- 
dividuals who share genes. A behavior costly to the 
self may nevertheless evolve if it increases the sur- 
vival and reproduction of kin who share the genes 
responsible for that predisposition. Kin-selection 
theory explains how altruistic behavior among kin 
facilitates the replication of genes shared by kin. The 
theory predicts, for example: that parents will invest 
more in their orspring than vice versa; that such 
investment is greater with higher parental assess- 
ment of the offspring’s reproductive potential; and 
that stepchildren are more likely to be abused that 
biological offspring. These predictions are well sup- 
ported by evidence (17-19). 
Reciprocal altruism. Although kin selection explains 
investment in kin, unrelated individuals also help 
each other (20). Such reciprocity exchanges are not 
confined to humans. Vampire bats, for example, 
share their blood meals after returning to their roost 
at dawn (21). Such exchanges even occur between 
species (22); alarm calls by one species alert mem- 
bers of other species, and cleaner fish remove par- 
asites from inside the mouths and gills of larger fish 
who protect cleaners from predation (23). 
Reciprocal altruism theory predicts: 1) A will help 
B (nonkin) if, in A’s view, the probability of recip- 
rocation by B times the probable benefit of this re- 
ciprocation equals or exceeds the initial cost to A 
(reciprocal behavior is distinguished for mutualism, 
where both parties gain simultaneously); 2) failure to 
reciprocate evokes moralistic aggression; 3) nonre- 
ciprocation will rise at the end of a period of asso- 
ciation (24); and 4) nonreciprocators will have fewer 
allies. These predictions are also supported by avail- 
able evidence (25,26). 
Evolutionary theory also explains why such emo- 
tions as pride, happiness, guilt and moralistic anger 
and such behaviors as guilt induction, intimidation 
and social ostracism have evolved. They facilitate 
reciprocal relationships (20, 25, 27, 28). Much of 
development and learning deals with refining recip- 
rocal behaviors, such as how to successfully manage 
reciprocity exchanges without being exploited or re- 
jected - battles among children often focus on who 
owes what to whom (29). Deviations from expected 
patterns of early kin and non-kin social relationships 
may contribute to disordered reciprocity relation- 
ships later in life (30). 
Parent-ofspring conyict and sibling rivilary. Although 
cooperation between parents, offspring and siblings 
is promoted by the genes they share in common, 
conflicts can be explained by the fact that many of 
their genes are not shared (31). Parental fitness (the 
number .of parental genes replicated among off- 
spring) is enhanced by the reduction of investment 
in maturing offspring in order to sooner reproduce 
again. Existing offspring try to counter this reduction 
and maximize their own fitness by delaying the birth 
of new siblings and by extracting as much from par- 
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ents as they can. The tendency in many species for 
offspring to object to weaning supports this view. 
The conflict has a natural end-point when existing 
offspring’s inclusive fitness is increased more by hav- 
ing a sibling with many shared genes than by con- 
tinuing to try to extract more resources from parents 
(3 1). 
Sibling rivalry has a parallel explanation and may 
arise in the same way. Siblings aid each other be- 
cause they share genes, but simultaneously compete 
for parental resources. 
Other conflicts. Similar evolutionary-based explana- 
tions account for male-female differences and as- 
pects of marital relationships. Males, for example, 
are more promiscuous, take more physical risks, and 
engage in more antisocial behavior (2,32,33). Spou- 
sal relationships combine reciprocity, kin selection 
and the management of conflict between kin. Spous- 
es’ mutual dependence for their reproductive success 
leads to common interests and reduces conflict (34), 
while conflict results from pressures on the partner 
to provide more care for offspring (3 l), to raise off- 
spring in specific ways, to help nongenetic relatives 
or to reciprocate help more completely. 
Cognitivelfeeling mechanisms. Specific ment a1 cap ac- 
ities appear to have evolved to serve specific func- 
tions, such as the ability to spot cheaters (35-38). 
Similar points apply to assessing the value of differ- 
ent types of reciprocation, the reproductive potential 
of offspring and the adaptive value of different be- 
haviors. 
The cognitive, physiological and behavioral pre- 
dispositions that characterize fear offer selective ad- 
vantages in dangerous situations (10). Behavior that 
is phylogenetically predisposed is not necessarily in- 
evitable, however. Indeed, it can, on occasion, be 
changed dramatically (10). For example, the fear of 
blood injury is strongly familial, develops in child- 
hood and is characterized by a vasovagal response 
and syncope. Yet it can be permanently eliminated 
with a few hours of systematic exposure therapy. 
The same applies to strongly predisposed fears of 
snakes or other animals. (Similarly, even innate de- 
fensive responses in molluscs, mantids and bii-ds can 
be eliminated by habituation analogous to exposure 
therapy.) The capacity for change is a built-in, se- 
lected trait that adjusts the behavioral preferences 
characteristic of the species. 
A better understanding of such evolved mecha- 
nisms is likely to deepen our insights into psycho- 
pathology. For instance, stranger anxiety, separation 
anxiety and phobias of heights, animals, storms and 
leaving one’s home range appear to be prepotent 
stimuli to which pre-prepared fear is readily con- 
nected ( 10). Over-responsiveness and/or rigidity of 
such mechanisms may help to explain some anxiety 
disorders. In other disorders, deficits in mechanisms 
for reciprocity negotiation seem probable. Such def- 
icits may be a product of proximate mechanisms 
leading to social isolation and associated chronic 
depression. 
An important aspect of evolved cognitive/feeling 
mechanisms is the distinction between symptoms 
and disorders. Some mental signs and symptoms, 
such as anxiety, sadness, irritability and withdrawal 
may be normal and adaptive when not severe. Like 
other aversive states, such as pain and nausea, they 
may point to circumstances liable to decrease indi- 
vidual fitness, but not necessarily be manifestations 
of disorders (7, 39). Interfering with their expression 
thus may be disadvantageous for the patient, just as 
blocking coughing or vomiting reflexes can be dan- 
gerous for patients with pulmonary or gastrointesti- 
nal infection. (Such behaviors are distinguishable 
from signs and symptoms that are more direct con- 
sequences of mental disorders, such as hiding from 
others because of persecutory delusions.) 
The evolutionary arguments discussed thus far are 
reasonable, intuitively acceptable and supported by 
research findings in some respects. Several points 
relevant to psychiatry emerge. First, many behaviors 
are strongly predisposed, such as sibling rivalry, 
moralistic aggression and familial rejection of non- 
maturing relatives. Second, some features of psy- 
chopathology reflect the prepotent and preparedness 
of responses. Third, features of disorders may reflect 
the normal operation of an adaptive response. De- 
pression following the loss of a loved one or a de- 
cline in social status is not only expected from an 
evolutionary perspective (13), but also may be tem- 
porarily adaptive in evoking social support from kin 
and friends (40). Similarly, jealousy, anger, decep- 
tion, self-deception and anxiety may be temporarily 
adaptive. Fourth, evolutionary interpretations are 
compatible with proximate mechanism explanations, 
such as postulated physiological changes associated 
with depressive disorders, inheritance of disorder 
vulnerability (pedigree studies) or compromised 
learning following aversive early experiences. Evo- 
lutionary theory offers existing psychiatric theories a 
context in which interrelationships between different 
findings and explanations emerge, and ultimate ev- 
olutionary and proximate mechanism explanations 
are clarified. 
Misconceptions about evolutionary theory 
Evolutionary theory applies mainly to other animals 
This view appears to assume that evolutionary bi- 
ology consists primarily of reconstructing a species’ 
phylogeny. Evolutionists argue instead that even if 
humans had no close phylogenetic relatives, evolu- 
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tionary theory (or a similar theory) would be neces- 
sary to help explain human behavior. Mechanisms 
of adaptation operate primarily at the individual level 
and shape behavior accordingly (functional analy- 
sis). Viewing humans in an evolutionary context 
leads to predictions that fit many otherwise hard to 
explain facts (such as prepotency for many behav- 
iors, step-parent abuse, sibling rivalry and parent- 
offspring conflict). Moreover, the theory leads to un- 
expected connections that are unlikely to be made 
without its guidance. Examples include: the possible 
adaptiveness of some antisocial behavior (such as 
cheating as an adaptive strategy) (4 1); abandonment 
of kin who are poor reproductive bets; child abuse 
by step-parents; male and female sexual jealousy 
and possessiveness (42); and agoraphobia as an ex- 
traterritorial fear associated with past threats when 
venturing outside the home range (10, 43, 44). 
Any species-characteristic behavior has a distri- 
bution limited in width by natural selection. Individ- 
uals vary in capacities to empathize, reciprocate, 
develop new goal-achievement strategies, compete 
and maintain physiological and/or psychological ho- 
meostasis (45). Human variations in these behaviors 
may have led to successful adaptation in many dif- 
ferent environments. Seeming facets of disorders, 
both symptoms and personality, may thus be con- 
sequences of a range of variation rather than mani- 
festations of psychopathology. In evolutionary terms 
a trait can be regarded as biologically normal if it 
enhances adaptive capacities. Severe psychopathol- 
ogy nearly always reduces fitness (46). Compared to 
normal people, those with mental disorders help kin 
less and are less helped by kin; they more often fail 
to reciprocate help from nonkin and have fewer 
friends; and they have reduced resource access and 
control (McGuire, submitted). 
Evolutionary theory provides psychiatry with some 
explanatory tools regarding individual differences: 
1) a framework that specifies the range of adaptive 
species-characteristic behavior patterns against 
which the behavior of individuals can be compared; 
2) a general theory and subtheories to interpret the 
adaptive significance of behavior; and 3) a frame- 
work to explain cross-person differences in attributes 
(trait distribution). 
Evolutionary biology ignores individual learning 
The human capacity to learn is vastly greater than 
that of other species. The view that evolutionary 
biology ignores individual learning seems to arise 
from the incorrect assumption that if something has 
been learned then it has no evolutionary roots. How- 
ever, the capacity to learn has been selected, like 
every other trait (47). Each species, including Homo 
sapiens, learns certain things more easily than others. 
Evolutionists do no ask, “Is it learned or innate?”, 
but rather, “How easily can this particular response 
be learned?”. A child’s readily learning to speak, for 
example, reflects built-in design features based on 
adaptive cognitive, sensory, and behavioral algo- 
rithms. Playing the piano, however, is difficult to 
learn - it has not been selected for. 
Culture is an alternative to  evolutionary explanations 
It is a mistake to see biology and culture (a set of 
behavioral rules) as sharp opposites (48-50). Cul- 
ture is not an alternative explanation to evolutionary 
theory. Rather, the ability to absorb culture is an 
evolved trait. Behavioral predispositions shape cul- 
ture and are shaped through it, leading, for example, 
to stable patterns of sexuality, pair-bonding, child- 
rearing, nonkin reciprocation and social status rela- 
tionships. The forms of these behaviors vary across 
societies, but all societies have stable patterns and 
values associated with strongly predisposed behav- 
ior. Amplification of biological predispositions is il- 
lustrated by avoidance of inbreeding (incest taboos), 
which is observed across cultures and among all 
studied primates (5 1). Similarly, deviant behavior 
(such as excessive risk-taking, impulsive behavior 
and non-reciprocation) that jeopardizes others’ 
health and resource control evoke rejection of the 
deviant (25). 
Evolutionary ideas are not relevant to treatment 
Advances in basic knowledge are more likely to 
lead to better formulations of treatment-relevant 
problems than to immediate changes in treatment 
procedures. Optimal treatment and prevention pre- 
supposes detailed knowledge about etiology and 
pathogenesis. Pediatric hospital procedures im- 
proved following Bowlby’s evolutionary-based stud- 
ies of attachment behavior. Appreciating the high 
probability of child abuse among stepchildren is 
likely to increase the recognition of the need for 
vigorous preventive measures. Therapists who un- 
derstand the principles of reciprocal altruism and 
the possible functions of self-deception and repres- 
sion (52, 53) are more likely to enhance the rehabil- 
itation of social skills. And attention to person- 
environment interactions is likely to optimize the 
selection of therapeutic recommendations: for exam- 
ple, teaching patients to select social environments 
that are responsive to their needs. 
Evolutionary hypothesis can not be tested 
Evolutionary hypotheses are eminently testable. For 
example, Daly et al. (42) provide extensive support 
for the prediction that, in most societies, sexual jeal- 
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ousy should be more extreme in males than in fe- 
males. Essock-Wale & McGuire (18) confirm that, 
within kin networks, resources flow from older to 
younger persons. Buss (54, 5 5 )  has shown that the 
frequency of divorce increases in infertile marriages. 
There is mounting evidence for the prepotency and 
preparedness of fear (lo). Scenarios of past evolu- 
tionary events cannot be proven, but the number of 
possible scenarios can be limited, because given sce- 
narios predict certain outcomes, some of which can 
be tested. For example, the hypothesis that domain- 
specific cognitive and feeling mechanisms mediate 
reciprocal exchange implies that basic exchange rules 
will be comparable across cultures, and that precur- 
sors will be present in our close phylogenetic rela- 
tives (35). 
Natural selection should eliminate genes for mental disorders 
If most mental disorders are maladaptive, then why 
do they persist? Evolutionists have advanced several 
explanations for the persistence of mental disorders. 
First, atypical or deviant traits tend only to reduce, 
not eliminate, the number of offspring. Thus, once 
a disorder appears in a population, it may remain 
for a considerable time. Reduced reproductive suc- 
cess is seen in obsessive-compulsive disorder, for 
example, but success is only marginally lower than 
among normals (10). Second, many disorders (such 
as late-onset depression, Huntington’s disease and 
Alzheimer’s disease) mostly appear after peak re- 
production periods, so that inclusive fitness is less 
affected. 
A third possibility is heterosis, in which even if it 
is maladaptive to have the entire set of genes that is 
needed to produce a given disorder, having some of 
them (short of the number necessary for the full 
disorder) may be advantageous in certain environ- 
ments. Possessing all the genes for sickle cell anemia 
(homozygous state) leads to an early death, but car- 
rying only some of them (heterozygous state) en- 
hances resistance to malaria. Manic-depressive psy- 
chosis and obsessive-compulsive disorder are 
maladaptive, but cyclothymic and meticulous per- 
sonalities may provide an adaptive advantage in cer- 
tain environments. (A variation of this idea has been 
suggested for the persistence of senescence (44, 56): 
the very genes that lead to senility in old age may be 
those that confer some benefit in youth.) 
Fourth, recessive traits may be hard for natural 
selection to eliminate if they only partially compro- 
mise adaptation, and many forms of mental illness 
are so infrequent that selection may be slow. Finally, 
some behaviors that are disorders in one culture 
might not be disorders in other cultures. Dyslexia, 
some forms of antisocial behavior and certain un- 
stable personality variants are examples. 
Existing theories in other disciplines explain findings at least as well 
as evolutionary theory 
Evolutionists accept this view for certain features of 
current theories. Evolutionary theory does not re- 
place other psychiatric theories. Rather, it 1) offers 
an additional perspective, 2) helps explain hereto- 
fore overlooked and understudied features of disor- 
ders and 3) provides an integrating framework. By 
adding ultimate causation to the current focus on 
proximate factors (such as genes, physiology, learn- 
ing and psychodynamics), the theory identifies bi- 
ases and constraints of behavior and physiological 
systems. Proximate psychiatric theories explain 
many of the mechanisms of disorders, such as the 
biochemical explanations of depression, reduced se- 
rotonin turnover among chronic abusive criminals 
(57) and petty criminality as the substrates on which 
evolution acts (58-60). Evolution can help to ex- 
plain why these mechanisms exist at all. 
The degree to which psychiatry is likely to incor- 
porate an evolutionary perspective will depend on 
specific applications that inform our understanding 
and improve treatment. We now turn to the subject 
of applications. 
Applications 
Criteria for distinguishing normal from abnormal behavior 
The current criteria for defining mental disorders 
include: 1) association with a somatic lesion (ana- 
tomical to molecular); 2) statistical deviances from 
normality (such as excessive self-centeredness, learn- 
ing disabilities and bipolar illness); and 3) subjective 
distress. Some authors have suggested “biological 
disadvantage” as a more appropriate criterion for 
identifying mental disorders (61, 62). This view ac- 
cords with an evolutionary approach. A disorder 
must impose some form of fitness disadvantage. Sta- 
tistical deviance does not directly equate with dis- 
orders - mental retardation is a disorder but genius 
is not. Moreover, it is difficult to know whether a 
condition is pathological without considering the en- 
vironment in which it occurs. Depression may be 
adaptive in a supportive social environment, just as 
schizoid personality may be adaptive in isolated 
areas. Insofar as our present-day environment dif- 
fers from past environments in which current traits 
were adaptive, past adaptive behaviors may become 
maladaptive (such as the prepotency of animal fears 
being more fitting for our ancestors). Subjective suf- 
fering has a high probability of association with mal- 
adaptive situations, whether caused by external cir- 
cumstances or by brain disorders. Feelings of 
pleasure and pain probably evolved to tell us whether 
prevailing circumstances are adaptive (27). Yet, even 
emotional suffering may be useful, just as pain, nau- 
93 
McGuire et al. 
sea and fatigue are useful, although all indicate the 
presence of some danger. 
The preceding points imply that both the features 
of disorders and the disorders themselves should be 
evaluated in the context of evolution. Further, fea- 
tures of disorders may be adaptive or result as a 
consequence of ultimate causation. These possibili- 
ties result in alternative etiological explanations of 
disorders, raise questions about classification and 
imply different approaches to treatment. 
Pathogenesis 
Evolutionary theory focuses attention on distinctions 
between etiology (cause) from pathogenesis (mech- 
anism). Showing that depression is associated with 
alterations in norepinephrine or serotonin neuro- 
transmission (mechanism) does not reveal its cause 
(etiology). Biochemical alteration may be a common 
end product reflecting an environmental or genetic 
etiology, or both. Serotonin neurotransmission is al- 
tered by changes in social status, and testosterone 
and cortisol levels rise in response to a variety of 
social events (25,63). Such changes, in turn, alter 
the probability of behavior (such as responsiveness 
to others and vigilance), how information is pro- 
cessed and response to drugs (64). Certain social 
interactions are as essential for physiological and 
psychological homeostasis among adults as they are 
among infants. Persons vulnerable to mental disor- 
ders tend to have reduced capacities to manage their 
social environments to produce homeostasis and a 
greater probability of developing a disorder (45). 
Such evolutionary-oriented studies focus on 
behavior-physiology interactions and provide data 
for the empirical foundation of a more comprehen- 
sive model of mental disorders (65). 
Evolved psychological mechanisms 
As mentioned, natural selection is likely to have fa- 
vored the development of cognitive/feeling mecha- 
nisms preadapted to particular situations. Examples 
include: respond immediately to perceived external 
danger; avoid or retaliate against those who inflict 
pain; assess others’ ability to reciprocate helping; 
detect cheaters; and be vigilant towards actual and 
potential competitors. The characterization of such 
mechanisms is likely to be a major focus of research 
during the next decade. This research should lead to 
a description of mental disorders in terms such as 
underactive and overactive mechanisms (for exam- 
ple, over-reading or under-reading environmental 
dangers) as well as in the specification of such re- 
sponses to behavior, physiological states and func- 
tional consequences: for example, chronic anxiety 
results from an overactive response to danger and/ 
or from the failure of mechanisms that inform one 
that a danger has passed. Conversely, we may come 
to recognize new disorders characterized by defects 
in capacities for anxiety, normal sadness and jeal- 
ousy. A clear implication is that appropriate treat- 
ment depends on both the mechanism involved and 
how it is awry (66). 
Functional capacities and disorder classification 
Functional deficits are considered in Axis V in DSM- 
111-R, but they are accorded far less importance in 
the day-to-day practice than are Axes I and 11. The 
concept of function and functional deficits is not the 
province of evolutionary theory. However, evolu- 
tionary theory provides a conceptual framework in 
which to organize and interpret functions and, in an 
evolutionary-derived classification, an assessment of 
functional capacities would be a pivotal taxonomic 
category. Persons with high anxiety, moderate de- 
pression, self-deception, mild bipolar illness and, in 
some instances, schizophrenia, often function above 
average. The same is true for some people who have 
socially unattractive traits, such as extreme self- 
centeredness and extreme needs to dominate and 
control others. For some disorders, decreased func- 
tional capacity is the primary finding, as is the case 
with antisocial personality and malingering. 
Assessment of functioning may also help explain 
within-disorder variance among current classifica- 
tion categories. Generalized anxiety disorder with 
minimal functional consequences may be classified 
separately from generalized anxiety disorder with 
major functional consequences. A focus on func- 
tional capacities would also alter treatment strate- 
gies and choices. A number of drugs that effectively 
reduce symptom intensity also reduce functional ca- 
pacities (such as decreased motivation and ability to 
concentrate). 
Integrating current theories 
Advocates of one school of psychiatry frequently 
disregard findings developed by other schools. Bio- 
logical psychiatrists are seldom interested in the 
findings of psychoanalysts or social psychiatrists, 
and some behaviorists ignore physiological aspects 
of mental disorders. Can such parochialism be 
changed? 
Evolutionary theory can encompass the major 
conceptual frameworks of psychiatry, help integrate 
relevant findings, appraise new ones and introduce 
additional possible explanations. Biological psychi- 
atry focuses on genetic-physiological predispositions 
and proximate mechanisms contributing to disor- 
ders, social psychiatry on environmental contribu- 
tions, behavioral psychiatry on atypical behavior and 
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psychoanalysis on thoughts and feelings. Each of 
these focuses may best explain certain abnormal 
features, although in differing degrees within and 
across disorders. The addition of ultimate causation 
(such as predispositions to behave in certain species- 
characteristic ways), functional assessment, the 
possible adaptive function of certain features of dis- 
orders, trait distribution and the physiological con- 
sequences of person-environment interactions en- 
riches the database of psychiatry and allows us to 
address what is intuitively obvious, the concept of 
multiple bases for disorders. 
Evolutionary theory also offers psychiatry a de- 
ductive framework and a set of testable hypotheses. 
For example: multiple family placements of young 
children during critical periods of development is 
predicted to lead to both suboptimal refinement or 
learning of basic social skills and to the expression 
of certain predisposed traits that otherwise might 
not be expressed; diminution of within-disorder 
adaptive traits because of drug treatment would be 
predicted to result in noncompliance with treatment 
recommendations; and relinquishment of behavior 
that is offensive to others will occur only if alterna- 
tive behaviors are associated with desired benefits. 
Limitations of evolutionary theory 
A number of questions and unresolved issues re- 
main. The limits of evolutionary explanations have 
not been fully explored, particularly where 2 or more 
tendencies conflict (su:h as reciprocate by helping 
another vs invest in kin). For some behaviors, evo- 
lutionary explanations may prove to be the most 
parsimonious: for example, excessive risk-taking, 
antisocial behavior and depression following loss. 
Nevertheless, proximate events (such as the critical 
physiological details of a drug overdose) associated 
with many disorders are best judged from existing 
theories. 
Second, there may be limits to the degree to which 
evolutionary theory can be applied to individuals. 
The current form of the theory derives largely from 
population genetics and behavioral ecology, which 
focus on the behavior of groups, not of individuals. 
Potential difficulties due to this history are illustrated 
by considering trait distribution: on the one hand, 
the concept informs our understanding of trait var- 
iance; on the other, there are limits to what can be 
inferred from a distribution curve to an individual. 
Similar limitations apply to all major etiological and 
pathogenic theories of psychiatry. 
Third, the weights assigned to and the timing of 
many experiences are not significantly informed by 
the theory. Although there is general agreement 
throughout psychiatry and among evolutionary bi- 
ologists on the critical importance of certain devel- 
opmental experiences in the shaping of individuals, 
the importance of specific events and the time-frames 
in which they optimally occur remains largely an 
empirical issue. Extreme upbringing conditions (such 
as the total social deprivation of infants) have clear 
developmental effects, as do instances of the absence 
of essential neurochemicals for normal development 
(such as Tay-Sacks disease) or chromosomal aber- 
rations (such as Down’s syndrome). However, much 
of our knowledge is based on atypical situations that 
do not themselves directly inform our understanding 
of the complex process of development, its timing, 
and the impact of conditions generally accepted as 
being within the normal range. 
Conclusion 
A strong case can be made for evolutionary biology 
deepening our perspective by clarifying the concepts 
and explanatory power of ultimate to proximate ex- 
planations and by offering psychiatry an integrating 
paradigm. The theory puts humans back into an 
ecological context and raises questions about the 
normal operation of adaptive mechanisms, particu- 
larly those elicited by unusual circumstances. Per- 
haps surprisingly, its understanding and recognition 
of variation results in a particularly humanistic ori- 
entation to people’s problems. 
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